The Crisis of Democratic Backsliding and Institutional Resilience: The Case of the African Union.

By Dr Pippie Hugues 

Executive Summary

Since the turn of the 21st century, the African continent has undergone significant transformation in its governance architecture. The transition from the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to the African Union (AU) in 2002 signaled a departure from the “non-interference” doctrine toward a policy of “non‑indifference.” This shift is codified in the AU Constitutive Act, which explicitly promotes democratic principles, human rights, and the rejection of unconstitutional changes of government (UCG).  Yet, despite these normative advancements, the last decade has witnessed accelerating “democratic backsliding”, the incremental erosion of the institutions, rules, and norms that sustain a democratic regime.  Key manifestations include renewed coups, manipulation of term limits (“constitutional coups”), and shrinking civic space. The central question is whether AU institutions can translate strong norms into consistent enforcement.
The AU’s core instruments, ACDEG, the PSC Protocol, and the APRM, provide a robust normative foundation. The challenge is an “implementation gap.” This brief argues for: (1) clarifying and operationalizing the AU’s stance on UCG (including constitutional manipulation), (2) applying targeted sanctions consistently, and (3) aligning responses with Regional Economic Communities (RECs) to enhance deterrence and resilience.

Key Messages:

• Democratic backsliding is increasingly “legalistic,” requiring clearer AU definitions and responses.
• The AU’s norms are strong; enforcement remains uneven, eroding credibility and deterrence.
• Consistent sanctions, REC alignment, and expanded access to continental justice mechanisms can strengthen resilience.

Introduction

The central problem confronting the African Union is the widening gap between its normative commitments to democracy and the empirical reality of authoritarian resurgence among its member states. While the AU has established robust frameworks, such as the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG), its enforcement mechanisms remain inconsistent.  Backsliding today often takes “legalistic” forms, where incumbents use formal rules to erode competition. This raises a critical question regarding institutional resilience: Can the AU’s multilateral framework withstand the pressure of sovereign resistance and effectively deter the reversal of democratic gains?

This brief analyzes the drivers of backsliding and evaluates AU resilience, examines the efficacy of the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the African Governance Architecture (AGA) in responding to governance crises. Finally, it provides actionable recommendations to strengthen the AU’s capacity to safeguard democratic stability.

The Drivers of Democratic Backsliding in Africa

Democratic backsliding in Africa refers to the gradual erosion of democratic norms, institutions, and processes.  Key modalities include executive overreach, renewed military intervention, and structured manipulation of elections.

Executive Aggrandizement and Constitutional Manipulation

Executive aggrandizement occurs when elected executives weaken checks on their power through legal and institutional changes, effectively hollowing out democracy from within. Unlike a traditional coup, this process is often incremental and technically “legal.” A primary tool is the manipulation of constitutional term limits.  By using compliant legislatures, courts, or referendums, incumbents reset term counts or remove limits, preserving electoral ritual while eroding alternation. This concentration of power often leads to “hyper‑presidentialism,” where the judiciary and legislature become appendages of the executive rather than independent checks.

The Resurgence of Unconstitutional Changes of Government

While the early 21st century saw a decline in military coups, recent years have witnessed renewed coups across several regions, abruptly halting democratic transitions. These UCGs represent a failure of both domestic governance and regional deterrence.  Despite “zero‑tolerance” norms, sanctions have been applied unevenly, weakening deterrence. Public frustration with corruption, insecurity, and limited delivery of “democratic dividends” creates openings exploited by juntas.

Manipulation of the Electoral Process

In contemporary backsliding, regimes rarely cancel elections; instead, they manipulate the “menu of manipulation” to ensure predetermined outcomes, tilting the field long before polling day. Strategies include: (i) harassment and “lawfare” against opposition, (ii) co‑optation of electoral commissions, and (iii) use of state resources and security forces.  The result is “competitive authoritarianism”: elections occur, but meaningful contestation is constrained.

Institutional Decay and the Role of Civil Society

The resilience of democracy depends on “horizontal accountability”, state institutions checking one another. Backsliding accelerates when judicial independence is compromised and civic space contracts (restrictive NGO laws, internet shutdowns, criminalized protest).  Where watchdogs are weakened, executive dominance consolidates.

Institutional Resilience: The African Union’s Response Framework

Institutional resilience refers to the ability of an organization to maintain its core functions and uphold its values in the face of shocks. The AU’s resilience is anchored in several pillars:

1. The African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG). Adopted in 2007, ACDEG is the most comprehensive regional treaty on democracy. It goes beyond prohibiting coups to include illegal means of accessing or maintaining power. However, many member states have either not ratified the charter or fail to implement its provisions into domestic law. (Action point: targeted technical assistance to domesticate ACDEG).
2. The Peace and Security Council (PSC) and Sanctions. The PSC is the primary organ for enforcing AU norms (Article 7). While the AU has been consistent in suspending states after military coups, it has struggled to respond with equal vigor to “constitutional coups,” leading to accusations of double standards. (Action point: define triggers and thresholds for “constitutional manipulation” under UCG).
3. The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). The APRM provides peer learning on governance. Its voluntary nature limits preventive power; greater uptake and follow‑through on National Programs of Action would enhance impact.

Challenges to Resilience: Sovereignty vs. Intervention

The primary obstacle lies in tensions between “non‑indifference” and state sovereignty.  Perceptions of overreach complicate collective action. This challenge is compounded by reliance on RECs with differing approaches, producing fragmented continental responses. Additionally, the AU’s heavy financial dependence on external partners limits operational autonomy and may skew priorities toward security over democratic consolidation.

While the AU’s normative framework, including the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG), the Peace and Security Council (PSC), and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), enshrines strong commitments to democracy, significant implementation gaps remain due to low ratification rates of ACDEG and limited APRM uptake. Despite these challenges, the AU has demonstrated resilience through decisive actions such as suspending Mali and Niger following unconstitutional power seizures. To bridge the gap between its norms and enforcement, the AU must clearly articulate the limits and obligations of its Constitutive Act (UCG), strengthen targeted sanctions, and harmonize its responses with RECs. This collective, principled approach, moving from “non-interference” to “non-indifference”, is essential to effectively uphold democratic governance across the continent.
Bridging the gap between norms and enforcement requires (i) clarifying UCG scope (including constitutional manipulation), (ii) standardizing sanctions, and (iii) coordinating PSC‑REC action, advancing a principled “non‑indifference” while respecting subsidiarity.

Conclusion

The AU stands at a crossroads:  closing the gap between norms and enforcement is essential to deter backsliding and preserve credibility. Navigating sovereignty tensions, overcoming fragmented REC responses, and reducing external funding dependence are critical to strengthening resilience.  Decisive steps on UCG definition, sanctions consistency, and PSC‑REC coordination will determine whether continental commitments translate into durable democratic practice.

Actionable Recommendations for the African Union

1. Government / AU Commission
   Domesticate ACDEG: The AU Commission should prioritize supporting member states in aligning their national laws with the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG). This involves providing targeted technical assistance and capacity-building programs to facilitate the translation of continental democratic standards into binding domestic legislation. By embedding these norms into national legal frameworks, democratic principles move beyond aspirational commitments and become enforceable legal obligations, strengthening governance and reducing the space for constitutional manipulation or democratic backsliding.
2. Peace and Security Council (PSC)
   Expand the Definition of Unconstitutional Changes of Government (UCG): The PSC must formally broaden the scope of UCG to explicitly cover constitutional manipulations designed to extend presidential term limits, commonly referred to as the “third term syndrome.” This legalistic form of autocratization has allowed many African leaders such as Compaoré of Burkina Faso in 1999, Paul Biya of Cameroon in 2008, Congo-Brazzaville in 2016 with Sassou Nguesso, Gabon in 2003 with Bongo, Ivory Coast in 2016 with Ouattara, Senegal in 2012 with Wade, Rwanda in 2015 with Kagame, Uganda in 2005 with Museveni, Namibia in 1998 with Nujoma, Sudan in 2005 with Al-Bashir, and Djibouti in 2010 with Guelleh to circumvent democratic transitions without facing sanctions.
3. Consistent Application of Sanctions: The AU’s current approach to sanctions is often inconsistent and influenced by geopolitical considerations, undermining its credibility and deterrence capacity.
   Adopt a standardized sanctions framework (types, thresholds, escalation, and review timelines) applied uniformly to all violations, with transparent public communiqués to strengthen deterrence.
4. Judiciary
   Enhance Access to the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Judicial independence is critical for upholding democracy, yet national courts are frequently co-opted or compromised by executive powers. Encourage more states to accept direct individual/NGO access and comply with judgments, positioning the Court as a continental backstop when national remedies fail.
5. Civil Society
   Strengthen Monitoring and Advocacy: Civil society organizations are essential partners in promoting transparency, accountability, and democratic resilience. The AU should support efforts to build the capacity of civil society to monitor governance practices, document abuses, and advocate for democratic norms. Empowered civil society can contribute to early warning mechanisms focused on governance issues, enabling preventive diplomacy before crises escalate into coups or conflicts. By fostering inclusive dialogue and civic engagement, civil society helps to create a political environment less prone to boycotts and authoritarian regression.
6. Regional Economic Communities (RECs):
   Establish PSC‑REC coordination protocols (shared triggers, timelines, and sanctions menus) to avoid fragmented responses and forum‑shopping.