By Joseph Thierry OKALA EBODE, Ph.D
The resurgence of democracy in Cameroon, mirroring trends across Francophone sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s, was characterized by electoral system reforms and the introduction of multiparty elections (1). However, the outcomes of these reforms and subsequent elections have often fallen short of expectations. The March 1992 multiparty legislative elections saw opposition parties secure a majority (92 out of 180 seats), yet they were unable to assume power. Since then, despite numerous presidential and local elections, the country has seen neither a transfer of power at the highest levels of government nor the local-level changes citizens have long desired. This aspiration for political alternation continues to be thwarted by a system that consistently reinstates the same leadership. Paradoxically, despite a proliferation of political parties (2), the influence and significance of the opposition continue to wane. This diminishing role of the opposition, coupled with growing democratic disillusionment (3), can be largely attributed to electoral fraud (4). Electoral fraud encompasses any illegal actions aimed at favoring particular candidates or party lists at the expense of others. This raises a critical question: How does electoral fraud, an illegal practice, lead to the disengagement of members of the opposing political landscape, the general public, and particularly the youth, from the political process? To address this, our analysis will focus on two main areas: first, examining fraudulent practices that operate within legal loopholes, and second, investigating overtly illegal fraudulent activities.
Legal Fraud, or the Construction of an Unequal Electoral System
The sociopolitical evolution initiated in Cameroon during the 1990s raised significant hopes for legal transition, particularly in the realms of constitutional and electoral law. This transition was expected to incorporate citizen participation as a crucial factor in the creation of law. Indeed, Mathieu B. Mebenga posits that “the concept of participation emerges as a polite fiction designed to validate the definitive integration of citizens into the process of legitimizing the creative power of law.” This new modality of law creation, which is not only an act of interpretation but also an act of will, should give rise to a new social contract. This contract should be based on “the pursuit of a normative and institutional balance reflecting sociopolitical changes […] capable of serving as a regulatory factor in the political system.” However, as years of electoral practice have unfolded, it has become evident that one of the most significant obstacles to realizing this vision is the lack of consensus in the creation of electoral law.
Indeed, the practice of seeking consensus in Cameroonian electoral law only truly began in 1996 with the constitutional revision carried out in the National Assembly through a questionable process. Following the promulgation of this constitutional law, Cameroon affirmed its commitment, following the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance, to develop the necessary legislative and policy frameworks for establishing and strengthening a culture of democracy and peace. (ACDEG, Chapter 5, Article 11). Furthermore, Cameroon set itself the objective of initiating appropriate legislative, executive, and administrative actions (ACDEG, Chapter 10, Article 14) to align its electoral corpus with its international commitments.
Despite these international commitments, the electoral system in Cameroon is far from being the result of a consensus among various political entrepreneurs and civil society actors. Instead, it appears to be the product of the governing party’s will alone. Indeed, in Parliament generally and the National Assembly in particular—the custodian of the electoral regime and the primary forum for consensus-building—the adoption of laws is highly contentious. This is evident in Law No. 2012/001 of April 19, 2012, establishing the Electoral Code, as amended and supplemented by Law No. 2012/017 of December 21, 2012, as well as Law No. 2006/011 of December 29, 2006, on the creation, organization, and functioning of Elections Cameroon (ELECAM). This lack of consensus leads to the crafting of rules that benefit certain political actors, notably the President of the Republic and his supporters. This is characterized by the partiality of ELECAM, over which the President exercises control, as well as over the judicial apparatus in general and the Constitutional Council in particular—the body tasked with making first and final rulings on electoral disputes. It also systematically incites pre- and post-electoral disputes that can jeopardize peace and social cohesion.
In addition to the lack of consensus characteristic of Cameroonian electoral law, there persists a unilateral process that leaves the President of the Republic—himself a major actor and stakeholder in the process—with the discretion to maintain ambiguity regarding election dates and the delineation of electoral constituencies (5). As with all legislative and municipal elections, the President of the Republic is the sole custodian of the electoral timetable, which he can use to catch his opponents off guard. These prerogatives vested in the President mean that electoral aspirants are never certain of the dates or the preservation of constituencies. Consequently, he keeps his adversaries in a state of constant alertness, hindering their optimal preparation for electoral participation.
Fraud on the Margins of Legality as a Barrier to Participation
The fraudulent practices that can be considered on the margins of legality primarily relate to voter registration, the control and issuance of voter cards, the display of voter lists, the distribution of voter cards, and finally, the selection of polling centers and stations. These fraudulent practices create an unequal playing field among candidates and severely limit the participation of a large number of citizens in the electoral process in general and in the actual election in particular.
Regarding voter registration, the major challenge for citizens is obtaining a national identity card (6). It is a well-known fact that Cameroonians struggle to obtain national identity cards; this is even more difficult for populations in rural areas where they also face issues with civil registration (7). While ELECAM organizes campaigns to stimulate voter registration, it makes no particular efforts to encourage registered citizens to collect their voter cards (8).
The selection of polling centers and stations is unilaterally decided by ELECAM. Despite the existence of voter list revision committees formed around the organization’s local branches responsible for managing the electoral process, stakeholders are not involved in this phase. We should acknowledge the application of Article 96, Paragraph 4 of the Electoral Code, which stipulates: “all polling stations must be located in a public place or a place open to the public.” Consequently, polling stations previously located in private residences, traditional chieftaincies, and military barracks, where access was contingent on voting orientation, have been relocated (9). Despite this progress, military personnel and other law enforcement forces have not been spared from intimidation at polling stations where they were meant to exercise their right to vote. This is evident, for instance in Yaoundé, at polling stations relocated from the headquarters brigade to Lycée Leclerc.
Regarding the display of voter lists and polling stations, this is systematically done late—in some cases the day before, or even on the voting day itself—in flagrant violation of the provisions of Article 83, Paragraph 2, which states: “The commission shall register the voter on the list which is published no later than four (04) days before the date of the poll.” Article 97, for its part, stipulates that “the list of polling stations shall be transmitted to the communal branches of Elections Cameroon for display at least eight (08) days before the date of the poll.”
This practice is compounded by the unequal distribution of voters across polling stations. This approach involves assigning more voters to polling stations located in voting centers where the electorate is more favorable to the incumbent president. During the 2018 presidential election, this practice significantly benefited voting centers identified in villages on the outskirts of Yaoundé, otherwise known as the rural zone, where the number of registered voters often doesn’t align with the voting-age population.
In some centers, according to consistent testimonies, the voter list was only displayed in the early hours of election day. The reason given by ELECAM officials was the fear that these lists might be vandalized. However, mobilizing law enforcement forces could have, in a collaborative effort, deterred any inclination toward destruction. Given the number of polling stations set by ELECAM’s general management, all could have been secured without limiting the intervention capabilities of the associated police and gendarmerie.
In contravention of the recommendations in Article 91 of the Electoral Code, paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, there was a disproportionate and imbalanced campaign display favoring the incumbent president. His posters and campaign materials saturated the country’s cities, while those of his competitors were scarcely visible.
Public funding allocated to candidates is not immune to fraud. Indeed, the first installment of public campaign financing, as per Article 286 of the Electoral Code, was deemed insignificant and ignored by some candidates during the 2018 presidential election. Consequently, candidates without substantial resources struggled to campaign effectively.
Regarding media access, equitable access for all candidates was not truly achieved, especially as news coverage during broadcasts was dominated by reports on direct or indirect activities of the ruling party and its candidate.
Conclusion
Electoral fraud thus appears as a serious violation of the rights of peoples and citizens to self-determination. Whether cloaked in legality or operating on its margins, these practices irreparably taint the regularity, transparency, honesty, and legitimacy of both the electoral processes and system. In Cameroon, they lead to a greater weakening of the social contract and political climate without providing any real gain in terms of legitimizing power.
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